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Under new democratic regimes, civil society organizations (CSOs) alter their political strategies
to better engage public officials and citizens as well as to influence broader political debates.
In Brazil, between 1990 and 2010, CSOs gained access to a broad participatory architecture as
well as a reconfigured state, inducing CSOs to employ a wider range of strategies. This article
uses a political network approach to illuminate variation in CSOs’ political strategies across four
policy arenas and show how the role of the state, the broader configuration of civil society,
the interests of elected officials, and the rules of participatory institutions interact to produce
this variation. Data for this article’s analysis come from a survey of three hundred CSO leaders
in the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte. The survey identified the strategies they employed to
promote policy change and direct resource allocation in the arenas of participatory budgeting,
health care, social services, and housing. Sociographs generated from survey results reveal a
distinct clustering within each policy arena of the strategies employed by CSOs, providing
further support to the usefulness of the analytical framework.

Introduction

Civil society activists, across Latin America, now engage in demonstrations, incremental participatory
venues, campaigns and elections, and oversight programs; they move inside and outside state and
democratic institutions in the hopes of securing scarce public resources for their communities.1 These
activists develop political, personal, and policy networks to forge better connections to civil servants and
public officials responsible for policy selection as well as service delivery. The dual reform movements
of democratization and decentralization that spread across Latin America over the past thirty years
have given activists a greater range of political and policy venues through which they can place their
demands (McNulty 2011; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Snyder 2001; Grindle 2007; Lavalle, Acharya, and
Houtzager 2005; Herrera 2017; Alvarez et al. 2017). How have civil society leaders adapted their strategies
to take advantage of this new democratic architecture? Given the diversity of strategies that researchers
have identified, a second question helps to account for these variations: How does the local context shape
civil society leaders’ strategies?
This article develops a political network approach to account for the wide range of the political activities
within and across different policy arenas (health care, housing, social services, basic infrastructure). Four
factors most significantly affect the strategies employed by civil society leaders: state formation, the
historical development of civil society, party politics, and specific rules that determine who can participate
in participatory venues. The process of state formation conditions whether a state has sufficient resources,
personnel, and competencies to fulfill required constitutional and legislative obligations; civil society
organizations (CSOs) are more likely to seek access to state agencies that have greater resources, more civil
servants, and broader competencies. If the state is weakly established and without resources, activists must
1

By state institutions, I mean administrative units that implement policies selected by the municipality. By democratic institutions,
I refer to participatory and representative processes. The former are used by citizens to deliberate over and select policies; the
latter are used to select leaders. Of course, public demonstrations are not formal institutions, but allowing citizens to hold public
demonstrations often requires enforcement of formal constitutional guarantees.
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turn to other outlets, such as protest and party politics, to advance their claims. Second, the density of civil
society and preexisting political repertories strongly condition CSOs’ development of new strategies. When
there are greater numbers of participants, CSO leaders have a broader base of resources that supports the
development of new strategies: a greater number of participants increases CSO leaders’ ability to overcome
participation fatigue, it helps them to have representatives present in multiple venues and demonstrates
to party and elected officials that their movement has the potential to mobilize citizens as voters and/or
as protesters. In addition, we also expect that CSOs working in a civil society field with a diverse set of
preexisting political repertories would be more likely to develop political strategies that permit them to
engage in multiple state and democratic arenas.
The third factor involves party politics. CSOs and social movements are situated within a broader
sociopolitical system that includes party politics. CSOs’ willingness to work within state and participatory
venues is strongly conditioned by their alliances with party leaders. When CSOs deem that elected officials
and their political appointees are more sympathetic to their demands, it is more likely that these CSOs will
work within state and democratic venues. Of course, as the degree of support decreases, it becomes more
probable that CSOs will protest and use contentious politics. Finally, participatory institutions across the
region use different rule sets to incorporate citizen participants. When these rules are more open, greater
numbers of citizens will participate, thus altering civil society leaders’ calculus regarding their choice of
strategies. This analytical framework permits a broader understanding of the changing nature of democratic
politics because it incorporates the vital roles of the state, civil society, political parties, and institutional
rules.
Across the region, Brazil stands out for having created an extensive participatory governance architecture,
a decentralized policy system in which municipalities deliver services, and a mobilized citizenry. Citizens
have many opportunities to exercise voice and vote in a series incremental policy-making processes,
including public policy management conferences, policy councils, and participatory budgeting (Abers and
Keck 2013; Avritzer 2009; Pires and Vaz 2012; Wampler 2015). If the mantra of many Brazilian CSOs during
the 1980s, as Brazil returned to democratic rule, was “autonomy” (Weffort 1989; Dagnino 1994), the mantra
evolved into “co-governance,” whereby CSO leaders became responsible for mobilizing their communities
and engaging in incremental policy-making within state-sanctioned venues. De-monopolization of access
points into the state is transforming the basic tenor of state-society relations, thus establishing new forms of
citizen engagement and accountability (Heller and Evans 2010; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000; Wampler and
Touchton 2016; Fox 2015). A key finding of this article is a clustering of political activities within different
policy arenas. Housing activists, for example, are likely to make strategy choices similar to other housing
activists but quite distinct from activists working in the social assistance policy arena. The implication of this
finding is that there are historical processes and institutional rules specific to each policy arena that induce
CSO leaders to act similarly within a policy arena but differently across distinct policy arenas.

Activists in Action across Multiple Venues

Three vignettes illuminate the multiple venues used by community activists in pursuit of both narrow
and broader public goods. CSO leaders need to master the technical minutia of legalistic policy-making
processes so that they may convince government officials that their proposals can be implemented.
Elsewhere, they must also connect strongly to government officials to build political support to show
that their projects should be implemented; this is often in the forms of working on electoral campaigns
or holding public demonstrations. They also use public venues to engage in contentious deliberation to
pressure government officials to implement their policy preferences.
Augusto, a combative delegate of the Belo Horizonte Participatory Budgeting (PB) meeting, approached
me at a downtown bus stop. After catching up on local PB news, we discovered that we were heading to
the same meeting at the social service council. Augusto explained that he had just been at a municipal
office (infrastructure), in an effort to resolve a sewage problem in his community. Because he was already
downtown, Augusto decided to attend the social service council meeting to make contact with government
officials regarding a different problem.
Augusto didn’t say a word during the social service council meeting—very different from his role at
regional PB meetings, where he is often the first to raise contentious issues and complain about government
inaction. There is a different deliberative dynamic at social service council meetings. Educated professionals
dominate the discussion, so there is considerable distance between the professionals’ technical language
and the knowledge base of community leaders. Augusto is representative of community activists who work
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in both participatory venues and government offices to secure social services and public works for their
communities; these leaders must learn a range of skills to secure their policy goals.
At a PB meeting in the central region, I met Patrocina, a community leader from a local favela. I crossed
paths with her the following week at a municipal housing council meeting. She was relatively new at
community organizing and policy-making, so she felt she needed to attend multiple meetings to gain
information, knowledge, and skills. Patrocina was trying to master the technical language associated with
policy-making while also attempting to organize her neighbors to attend participatory meetings. When I
visited her home, she showed me with immense pride the sewage lines that had been built through the PB
process; she was participating because she wanted to see if it would be possible to tear down their existing
houses and build apartment buildings. The policy-making processes created by the government greatly
expanded the number of opportunities for her to directly interact with government officials. Patrocina was
using the participatory institutions to establish policy and political connections among her neighbors, other
CSO leaders, and government officials.
Julio, an active community leader in the Alto Vera Cruz favela, was deeply involved in multiple participatory
institutions, a community organization, electoral campaigns, political party politics, and cultural events. He
is a full-time community leader, receiving a small monthly stipend from the Communist Party of Brazil (PC
do B) in addition to earning money as an event organizer. When Julio was a teenager in the early 1990s,
he organized community dances that were well attended by local teenagers. Leaders from PC do B noticed
his organizing skills and encouraged Julio to attend PB regional meetings to secure municipal funding for
his cultural events. Due to his success in PB regional, Julio became very involved in community organizing,
serving as an important bridge between an aging activist population and younger people. Julio’s community
and political organizing allows him to wear many different hats—party official, communist ideologue,
cultural coordinator, aide to a municipal legislator, community leader—and he is able to build a dense local
network and a broad network across the municipality.
These vignettes illuminate the diversity of strategies that CSO leaders use to advance their interests. They
must work in a variety of venues and master different skills—from reading technical reports to organizing
protests—in order to advance their organizations’ interests.

Alternative Explanations

Three explanations are commonly used to explain social movements’ and CSOs’ activities: political
opportunities, contentious politics, and political cultural.
The political opportunity approach provides an explanation based on a combination of both structure and
agency (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). The structural argument identifies key economic
and political institutions that frame the environment in which social movements operate. The agency is
based on the ability of citizens to take advantage of political “opportunities” through which to advance
their agenda. This approach emphasizes properly identifying the political opportunities that permit social
movements to effect change; it also emphasizes identifying moments of high mobilization rather than
incremental politics over an extended period. Thus, the real limitation to this approach is a strong focus
on these moments of high action and an inability to sufficiently capture the day-to-day workings of social
movements. The analytical framework developed in this article is better situated to account for the ongoing,
day-to-day political and policy management that is now occurring.
A second explanation prominent in the social movement field is a focus on contentious politics, which
seeks to show how politically marginalized actors use political disruption and political protest to advance
their policy agenda. Contentious politics is a particularly important tactic used by social movements (Tarrow
1998). However, one drawback of the literature on contentious politics is that it doesn’t sufficiently account
for the multiple other avenues of political action undertaken by social movement leaders. This article
demonstrates that CSO leaders are now engaged in a wide variety of political activities. CSOs in Brazil and
across Latin America use contentious politics as well as participation in electoral campaigns, participatory
institutions, and direct contact with government officials over policy adoption and implementation.
The role of political culture is a final explanation that scholars have long used to account for differences
regarding the political behaviors and attitudes of civil society actors. Robert Putnam and colleagues (1993),
in their classic Italy study, argue that differences in the density of civil society offer the best explanation for
political, economic, and social change. Evelina Dagnino (1994) draws from new social movement theory and
Gramsci to demonstrate how political contestation over the values that undergird a political system is vital
to understanding how and when social change can occur. Dagnino’s work overcomes the path dependency
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determinism of Putnam’s work, but her work is limited by an unclear explanation regarding the incentives
and motivations that induce CSO leaders to work in different political and policy environments. The
analytical framework developed in this article incorporates Dagnino’s key insights regarding the importance
of political contestation over constitutionally guaranteed rights, but moves beyond the political cultural
approach to better capture specific incentives that encourage CSOs to select different strategies.

Analytical Framework

The historical development of the state conditions the strategies used by CSO leaders, due to the degree
to which there is an administrative state capable of implementing public goods. The establishment of a
state bureaucracy capable of delivering public services induces CSO leaders to focus their political energies
on gaining access to civil servants and elected officials who set policies and control those resources (Abers
and Keck 2013). CSO activists use formal policy-making institutions, such as participatory institutions and
public hearings, as well as informal processes, such as direct contact and developing personal networks,
to pursue their interests within the broader state apparatus. A state that has resources and the capacity
to implement public goods will induce CSO leaders to align themselves with civil servants and elected
officials who control the state. CSO leaders attempt to redirect the state in the hope that state resources
and authority will be used in their community.
In addition, the development of a larger state administrative apparatus, which began in many Latin
American countries during the 1940s and 1950s, is also associated with expansion of public employee unions
(French 1992). In the current democratic period, unions often represent the interests of their members by
working across multiple formal institutional venues as well as within civil society. Union members often
align themselves with social movements operating in civil society, altering the configuration of civil society.
Second, the historical development of civil society within each policy arena strongly affects the political
strategies employed by CSOs. A combination of the established repertories of political engagement and the
membership base of the CSOs helps to explain their strategies (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996). By repertories of political engagement, I refer to the willingness of CSOs to utilize different tactics
such as holding public demonstrations, attending public hearings, or engaging in participatory venues
(Tarrow 1998; Holston 2008; Alvarez 1990). The membership base is a way to conceptualize the density and
demographic profile of the CSOs. Density matters, especially in democratic settings, because larger numbers
of activists can help amplify a CSO’s voice and allow CSO members to attend different official functions (i.e.,
attend public hearings, go to protest events) (Putnam 1993).
The demographic characteristics of CSOs’ membership base (actual as well as potential) also have a
major impact on their strategies. When the potential beneficiaries of proposed policies are also active CSO
members, there is a greater likelihood that a broader proliferation of strategies will be employed. When a
small professional elite that won’t directly benefit leads the CSO, there will be a narrower set of political
strategies. For example, middle-class professional-led CSOs that advocate on behalf of “pro-poor” policies
are likely to act very differently than CSOs that are led by individuals who will personally gain from policy
change.
Third, the political coalition in charge of the executive branch (president, governors, and mayors) often
sets the tone for how different participatory institutions will be used (Keck and Abers 2013; Wampler
2015; Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006). It is well-documented that strong presidential systems are a feature
across Latin America, and this phenomenon clearly extends to Brazilian municipalities. Executives have
significant leeway in the amount of support they extend to new democratic institutions; they can open or
close different entry points into the local state through their funding priorities, their administrative staffing,
and willingness to work with CSOs.
Fourth, the rules that regulate who can participate in participatory institutions as well as over what they
deliberate also significantly affects the strategies employed by CSOs (Fung 2006). Rules that promote more
open participation induce greater numbers of ordinary citizens to assume leadership positions and to have
greater levels of contact with government officials. Rules that are more restrictive are more likely to draw in
a smaller number of professional CSOs. In addition, participatory venues that are highly technical in nature
are also more likely to draw in professional CSOs and discourage ordinary citizens from participating.
These four factors—state, civil society, elected political coalition, and institutional rules—have independent
and interactive effects on the configuration of civil society organizing. Theoretically, this approach advances
the debate over existing approaches. Most importantly, it incorporates both structure and agency to account
for the ongoing political strategies that are used during the process of building out incremental politics. The
structural approach is rooted in the long-term state and civil society development. Agency is then rooted
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in the specific incentives provided by participatory institutions as well as the support extended by elected
political leaders. This approach moves beyond the traditional political opportunity approach because it
accounts for the normal political activities that characterize so much of civil society organizing.
Second, the analytical framework helps to account for the clustering of political activities as revealed
by the use of the political network approach. The analysis of the empirical evidence, presented below,
illustrates that CSO leaders demonstrate similar patterns of behavior within each specific policy arena. This
draws attention to the vital importance of moving beyond single case studies, as well as to how specific
institutional arrangements help condition action.

New Institutional Architecture

Brazil experienced five key institutional changes during the 1980s and 1990s that altered how citizens
and activists engage the state and democratic processes. First, the transition from authoritarian military
regime to representative democracy in the mid-1980s included both the military regime’s efforts to hand
control over to civilians and the extensive mobilization of labor unions and social movements during
the 1970s and 1980s (Stepan 1989). The second major institutional change was the promulgation of the
1988 Constitution, the “citizens’ constitution” (Avritzer 2009), which formally extended political and social
rights to all citizens.
The third institutional change was the decentralization of the federal system, especially with regard
to service delivery (Montero and Samuels 2004). Municipalities spend roughly 15 percent of all public
resources, with states spending around 35 percent. Increased municipal-level control over service delivery
heightened citizens’ and CSOs’ attention to the state as they seek to gain access to the social rights formally
controlled by the 1988 Constitution.
The fourth change was establishment of an extensive participatory architecture that permits citizens
and CSOs multiple opportunities to be involved in ongoing deliberative policy-making processes (Avritzer
2009; Pires and Vaz 2012). This participatory architecture (councils, conferences, participatory budgeting)
has clearly altered the institutional terrain on which citizens and CSOs seek to engage the state. By 2015,
there were over fifty thousand public policy management councils (Wampler 2015; see also Barreto 2011).
Between 2000 and 2010, roughly 50 percent of Brazil’s population lived in a city using participatory
budgeting (Wampler 2015). CSO leaders’ selection of political and policy strategies thus partly stems from
how citizens are included in these processes. PB programs allow for open participation, which is then often
followed by an internal process in which citizens elect PB delegates. Policy councils are not based on open
participation, but on a prior selection of representatives to them. Thus, PB begins with an open-participation
model whereas councils are based on a more limited number of representatives.
The final institutional change was the expansion of the public goods provided by the state during the first
decade of the twenty-first century. The economic boom, accompanied by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s
interest in social programs to help poor citizens gain access to basic social rights, provided the resources
and political will to enhance what the state was able to provide to citizens (Schneider 2016). This altered the
political calculus of CSO leaders, as they were more actively looking to the state for public goods.
In sum, the expansion of rights and the decentralization of social service delivery induced CSOs to target
the local state to secure access to public resources. There is now a significant expansion of signaling methods
(voting, protests) as well as venues (councils, conferences, government offices) that involve ongoing contact
and interactions among citizens, CSOs, and government officials.

Belo Horizonte

This article narrows the focus to the city of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, to illustrate how CSOs adapted their
political strategies to take advantage of the new participatory architecture and expanded state. Five
successive leftist and center-right city governments in Belo Horizonte, the state capital of Minas Gerais,
institutionalized a transformative political project intended to promote social justice and popular
participation. A political coalition led by the Workers’ Party (leftist during 1980s and 1990s, centrist in
2000s) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (a moderate, center-right party) enacted a series of policy reforms
in which they sought to include citizens’ voices in decision-making and to direct scarce resources to lowincome neighborhoods. Over an eighteen-year period (1993–2010), government leaders adopted a series
of public venues to provide citizens with access to government officials, allow citizens a voice in the policymaking process and, finally, give citizens a vote over policies and programs.
The methodological approach employed is comparative, but within a single major city. Belo Horizonte
has a population of 2.5 million (the metropolitan regime is roughly 5 million), and it has more than forty
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municipal-level councils, and several hundred community-based councils (e.g., local health care posts, schools,
parks). There are more than five thousand positions to which citizens are elected (e.g., local health care
council; participatory budgeting delegate) (Wampler 2015, 79). There are also three different PB programs,
which involved over 150,000 participants during the 2008–2009 policy-making cycle (Wampler 2015, 80). A
comparative analysis of four policy arenas in a single city provides the methodological advantages of holding
the city’s long-term sociopolitical development constant while allowing a more precise identification in how
state formation and the historical development of civil society affect the shape of political life.

Methodological Approach: Political Network Analysis

Citizens, CSO leaders, and government officials at Brazil’s local level constantly interact (Abers and Keck
2013; Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Wampler 2007, 2015). A network-based approach
allows us to more systematically identify the clustering of activities utilized by CSO actors. Social network
analysis (SNA) seeks to contextualize individuals’ actions by analyzing individuals in their sociocultural and
political environment. SNA has largely been centered on the connections among individuals (Granovetter
1973; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti and Everett 1997; McClurg and Young 2011). Within the
discipline of political science, there has been a recent turn to network theory to better account for
individuals’ voting decisions (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006) and how they join social movements (Diani
1992), participate in voluntary organizations (Ansell and Gash 2008), exercise power (Lazer 2011), or form
political networks (Knoke 1994).
A political network analysis (PNA) is based on the core idea that the “basic units of any complex political
system are not individuals, but positions or roles occupied by social actors and the relations or connections
between these positions” (Knoke 1994, 7; see also McClurg and Young 2011). CSO leaders have leadership
roles within their communities and organizations, which lead to work within a variety of institutions (state
agencies, democratic venues). PNA allows for the “mapping” of the political activities of CSO leaders, who
are their organizations’ representatives in a wide range of institutional and extra-institutional spheres. PNA
draws heavily on a relational perspective, which analyzes how actors are embedded in specific institutional,
social, cultural, and political structures (McClurg and Young 2011; Baiocchi 2005; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva
2011).
It was been well established that CSO leaders from poor communities work within participatory
institutions to deliberate over and help select specific policies (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Avritzer
2002; Wampler 2007 and 2015). In these new venues they attempt to secure desperately needed resources
for their communities and work within these institutions to expand their ties to political leaders and key
bureaucrats. These CSO leaders often face two significant hurdles as they seek to gain public goods and
state support for their communities: a lack of the personal connections and networks that have long been
a hallmark of access to political power in Brazil, and grave informational asymmetries vis-à-vis professional
civil servants and full-time political operatives. “The most important feature of a community power structure
is its multiple networks of interorganizational information and resource exchange” (Knoke 1994, 138). CSO
leaders use participatory institutions to expand their policy networks as well as to improve their technical
knowledge, allowing them bring information from the community into the state and vice versa. PNA creates
the opportunity to account for variation across the different policy arenas.

Methods and Evidence

Our research team administered a survey to three hundred CSO leaders to assess their political activities and
then analyzed the results using a political network analysis approach. The data are two-mode or affiliation
data, which means that they capture the relationship between the individual and an event or institution.
The data are binary, which means we know whether or not the individual participated in an event or an
institution in a given time period. Affiliation data has both relational and individual-level characteristics
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).
The four cases were selected because they offered considerable variation in state development, civil
society participation, and participatory institutions. Participatory budgeting was selected because it was
a pioneering case of direct citizenship engagement, extensive state and government involvement, and
robust civil society engagement. The housing policy arena was selected because it had extensive civil society
engagement in multiple participatory institutions. The social service policy arena was selected because it
is a relatively new formal policy arena, with many programs and institutions being established during the
new democratic period. Finally, health care was selected because the civil society field is one of the strongest
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and best established across Brazil, and because the right to health care was one of the most important that
governments sought to extend to citizens.
The “CSO Leader” survey included one hundred PB delegates, one hundred social service CSO leaders, fifty
housing leaders, and fifty health care leaders.
• Participatory budgeting regional: “PB delegates” are elected within PB regional to monitor the implementation of small and mid-sized projects that were selected within the process. We obtained a list of
1,200 PB delegates and out of this list 100 respondents were randomly selected.
• Housing: Housing núcleo leaders were included in the survey. A housing núcleo must organize one
hundred families, all of whom had lived in Belo Horizonte for at least two years, and had a monthly
household income of less than US$300. Fifty housing núcleo leaders were interviewed from the 172
housing núcleos formally registered with the municipality.
• Health care: Municipal and regional (submunicipal) council members were included in the survey. We
drew upon available lists of council members at the municipal and regional levels (nine regions). The
council members were elected members representing CSOs (not including unions) within the council.
The fifty respondents were randomly selected from a list of five hundred individuals.
• Social services: Community organizations formally registered with the Municipal Council for Social Services (Conselho Municipal de Assistência Social, CMAS) were included in the survey. Out of a total of 686
associations that were registered at the time of survey, 100 associations were included in the survey.
Two types of CSOs are missing from the survey. First, we were unable to systematically include evangelical
associations. Our research team had numerous contacts with evangelical leaders, but they were unwilling
to provide the necessary contact information. Second, small organizations that have limited contact with
government officials or public institutions are not included in the survey. These organizations often have
short life spans and face significant difficulties maintaining participation.
There are a total of eight “institutional” or “event” nodes, which are the events or institutions that the
CSO leaders reported actively using in the past two months. There are three hundred “individual” nodes,
representing each individual respondent. The data do not link individuals to each other (Augusto to
Patrocina) or to the same events (Demonstration on X day in Y location). Rather the data reveal the types of
activities utilized by citizens (e.g., Augusto participated in a demonstration in past two months).

Civil Society Alliances

Participatory institutions provide a structure that encourages CSO leaders to engage broader networks
outside their community and develop alliances because these leaders are in constant contact with one
another. These institutions also help CSOs mobilize their own followers because the incentive structure
encourages the distribution of specific benefits, helping CSOs to overcome hurdles associated with
collective organization (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Ostrom 1990; Olson 1965). Information flows
between CSO leaders and government officials as well as between CSO leaders and citizens, meaning that
CSO leaders are intermediaries linking state and society. The bonds among CSO leaders allow them to share
information and build a broader collective organization that can be used to apply pressure on government
officials. To capture CSOs leaders’ activities, the survey included three questions:
1. Does your association have weekly or biweekly meetings? Node label: “Attended CSO meetings”
2. Did you attend a public demonstration in the past two months? Node label: “Attended demonstration”
3. Did you attend a PB meeting or a council meeting (municipal or regional) in the past two months?
Node label: “Attended PB meeting” (PB delegates only) OR “Attended municipal council meeting”
These three nodes tap into distinct types of activities. The first node, “Attended CSO meetings,” addresses
the extent to which CSO leaders participate in internal meetings. Holding meetings is vital to sharing
information among members, reaffirming shared bonds among members, and refining their organization’s
mission (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The second node, “Attended
demonstration,” taps into the willingness of the CSO leader to engage in demonstrations and protest
activities central to the success of social movements (Tarrow 1998; Mische 2008). Because there is a political
risk for activists engaging in a public demonstration against the local municipal government, it is likely
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that these participants would have stronger “bonds of solidarity” with their fellow citizens and other CSOs
(Alexander 2006). The use of contentious politics is carefully considered, as demonstrations can severely
strain relationships with government officials and other power holders.
The third node, labeled either “Attended PB meeting” or “Attended council meeting,” addresses CSO leaders’
recent participation in participatory institutions, demonstrating the importance of these new institutions
to leaders’ political strategies. We would expect that participatory democracy is more central to those policy
arenas that have more robust forms of social movement mobilization.

CSO-State Connections

CSO leaders and citizens bring information about problems to the attention of government officials, who
then must decide how to act. Government officials share information with CSO leaders concerning what
types of resources are available and what steps must be taken by CSO activists to secure resources. CSO
leaders develop connections to government officials and subsequently use these connections to build the
broader frames that allow them to maintain the vitality of their organizations (McAdam, McCarthy, and
Zald 1996).
CSO leaders often engage with the state and democratic institutions to secure a combination of narrow and
broader public goods. Broader public goods can include projects that transform their region or community.
These policy goods are secured through deliberative processes in which citizens have the legal right to
vote on resource allocation. CSO leaders also use the connections forged inside of participatory institutions
to secure specific goods that may benefit specific individuals. CSO leaders cultivate ties to public officials
because they help overcome the basic collective action problems: Individuals are more likely to engage in
collective action organizations if they can secure targeted, specific benefits.
In Brazil (and most other parts of Latin America), there has long been a middle- and upper-class bias
associated with access to information. Low levels of education, limited readership of newspapers, and few
formal links to government institutions have long made it difficult for the majority of Brazilian citizens to
gain access to information. CSO leaders and citizens now have multiple venues through which they can
gather information—public hearings, participatory governance meetings, government officials’ formal
presentations and workshops, and informal conversations with government officials—all of which help CSO
leaders from poor communities overcome information asymmetries (Stiglitz 2007). Three questions capture
these relationships:
1. Did you contact X municipal department in the past two months? Node label: “Contact with X department” (X = health care, housing, social services, or planning/PB regional)
2. Did you contact a municipal legislator in the past two months? Node label: “Contact with legislator”
3. Does your organization currently have a government contract to provide social services? Node label:
“Active government contract”
The first node, “Engagement X department,” captures the CSO leaders’ direct interaction with a state official
in relevant administrative agencies (e.g., health care, housing). This taps into ongoing connections linking
CSO leaders to public officials. The second node in this section, “Engagement with municipal legislator,”
taps into the participation of CSO leaders in an additional public venue that shows the worthiness of their
organizations’ demands as well as their ability to turn out their followers. The legislative branch serves as
an entry point that establishes the means for obtaining constituency service.
Finally, the third node in this section, “Active government contract,” identifies CSOs that receive public
resources to provide services to citizens. CSOs with formal government contracts are more likely to be more
professionalized than those CSOs without contracts. There is a greater potential for co-optation of CSO leaders
by government officials if the leaders rely on discretionary public funding to sustain their organizations.

Campaigns and Elections

Elections are at the core of representative democracy. Elections are also vital to participatory democracy
because the political party in control of the executive branch has a tremendous impact on how the new
institutions will function and how rights will be extended (Abers 2000; Abers and Keck 2013; Avritzer 2009;
Wampler 2007). The constant interaction of CSO leaders and government officials in formal participatory
venues, as well as in parallel, informal interactions, produces multiple opportunities for them to forge
new alliances. CSOs leaders are well positioned to influence the voting behavior of ordinary citizens. In
Brazil, where the larger political context is framed by weak party identification, lower voter information,
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and strong incentives to cultivate a personalistic vote, CSO leaders emerge as key intermediaries between
candidates and voters (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006).
Two questions address these nodes:
1. Did you attend a campaign rally in the 2008 municipal elections? Node label: “Attended campaign
rally”
2. Did you speak with your association’s members about a specific candidate? Node label: “Campaigned
among members”
The first node, “Attended campaign rally,” is geared to show the willingness of CSO leaders to be involved
in campaigns and elections. When CSO leaders attend these events, they attend as participants but also as
representatives who mobilized others to attend. The second node, “Campaigned among members,” taps
into whether the CSO leaders sought to influence their members’ votes, indicating whether CSO leaders
are acting as intermediaries between voters and candidates.

Results

To assess the differences across the four public policy arenas, we begin with degree centrality, which
measures the importance of the different political activities utilized by CSO leaders in each policy arena.
In Table 1, the three most central activities utilized in each policy arena are in bold text. In all four policy
arenas, participation in weekly or biweekly CSO meetings was the most common activity.
The density statistic (last row) measures the proportion of actualized connections out of the total possible
number of connections. Table 1 shows that housing activists have the densest networks, which means that
their leaders are involved in the most activities. PB delegates are the least active CSO leaders—a surprising
finding since there is an implicit understanding in the broader PB literature that PB serves as a springboard
for greater civic participation (Baiocchi 2005).
To visualize the differences among CSO activity, UCINET and NetDraw software were used to produce
sociographs of the activities reported by CSO leaders (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Figure 1
includes PB delegates (N = 100), Figure 2 includes the social service leaders (N = 100), Figure 3 includes
health care leaders (N = 50), and Figure 4 includes housing leaders (N = 50). The figures illustrate the
connections between each survey respondent and seven different nodes. The layout of the nodes was based
on a geodesic “spring embedding technique” that locates the nodes “in such a way as to put those with
smallest path lengths to one another closest in the graph” (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chapter 4). The size
of the event nodes is calculated based on the degree of the nodes, which is the number of connections to
the individual-level nodes. In the sociographs below, the line represents the connections of each individual
to the eight institutional or event nodes. We now turn to the four policy arenas.

Table 1: Degree centrality and density.
PB regional

Health care

Housing

Social service

Attended CSO meetings

.778

.843

.961

.889

.873

Attended demonstration

.323

.451

.510

.232

.347

Attended PB meeting

.374
.745

.549

.495

.633

.455

.667

.902

.778

.807

Engagement with municipal legislator

.162

.118

.490

.303

.257

Active government contract

.152

.059

.118

.768

.333

Attended campaign rally

.293

.333

.569

.111

.287

Campaigned among members

.475

.412

.608

.283

.423

.376

.453

.588

.482

.495

Attended Municipal Council meeting
Engagement with [X] department

Density

All

Source: CSO leader survey, 2009. Given the different number of survey responses for each policy arena, density and
degree centrality were measured separately.
Note: Boldface indicates the three most central activities utilized in each policy arena.
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Participatory budgeting (PB): My PB, my neighborhood

Belo Horizonte’s PB process is now a routinized part of policy making. A biannual participatory process
provides opportunities for citizens to engage in substantive deliberation, political theater, and policy
selection (Wampler 2007, 2015). The first phase of PB, from 1994 to 2002, involved greater contestation
and vitality among CSOs, which highlights the importance of the political coalition in control of the state.
Over time, participatory budgeting institutionalized community-level participation into a single policymaking process. Public officials engage interested citizens and CSOs into a routinized PB process in which
they vote on the allocation of small- to medium-sized infrastructure projects to be implemented by the
municipal government (local state). Belo Horizonte’s PB regional program directs high levels of resources
to low-income communities—nearly 60 percent of PB resources go to the poorest communities—suggesting
that specific institutional rules strongly affect mobilization and turnout (Wampler 2015, 113).
The sociograph in Figure 1 is drawn on the activities of one hundred PB delegates. At the core of their
activity are CSO meetings involving their own members; these meetings engender the “bonds of solidarity”
so vital to helping CSOs maintain their collective action (Alexander 2006; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996). Only 15 percent of the PB delegates work with a CSO holding an active government contract to
provide social services, which means that these CSOs are not dependent on the state for their livelihood.
Importantly, the data shows that two-thirds of the PB leaders are politically active only in local PB,
and that a third of PB activists are engaged politically across multiple venues beyond PB. The majority
of PB delegates do not seek out other participatory or political venues to press their claims, which may
be due to the efforts of government officials to organize PB and bring the policy-making process to their
communities. As a result, political and policy focus is narrow: “My neighborhood, my PB.” The CSO leaders
involved in PB are best categorized as neighborhood organizers. PB doesn’t serve as a springboard to
encourage most PB delegates to be involved politically across a broader political spectrum. Thus, PB plays
a much weaker role as a “school of democracy” than was expected or has been found elsewhere (Baiocchi
2005). This finding confirms a criticism of PB programs: that PB programs induce activists and citizens
to narrow their political attention to their local community rather than inducing them to organize more
broadly (Navarro 2003).
However, there is a second group of activists who engage in a number of activities. In the upper section of
Figure 1, there is a clustering of activity around campaigns and elections, and another around demonstrations.
These CSO leaders are involved in community organizing, electoral politics, and contentious politics, and

Figure 1: My PB, my neighborhood. CSO Leader Survey, Belo Horizonte, 2009.
Small circles = individual survey respondent (the six smaller circles at the upper left of the sociograph
represent individual respondents who had no connections to any of the events or institutions); larger
circles = institutional venues or event.
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they participate locally as well as more broadly as they seek to secure specific public policy goods for their
communities. They are likely to have been positively influenced by the democratic and policy opportunities
afforded by PB, and illustrate that PB can promote political awareness (Baiocchi 2005; Wampler and Avritzer
2004).
Returning to the analytical framework, we first find there was a local state capable of implementing basic
infrastructure projects. Strong community-based organizations forged alliances with elected officials to use
this local state capacity in favelas and poor neighborhoods. The open rules channeled participation among
community leaders and citizens into PB, which may help explain why two-thirds of the PB leaders only
engage in local issues. PB brought public officials directly into their communities, reducing the need for
most CSO leaders to expand their participation beyond their local community. In sum, a capable state and
an open participatory process focused on local issues encouraged CSOs to focus their political organizing
locally as well.

Social service: Third-sector service delivery organizations

The defining feature of CSOs in the social service policy arena is the presence of formal government
contracts—77 percent of CSOs have service delivery contracts. The leaders of these CSOs have regular contact
with civil servants, attend internal meetings, and have high levels of education (75 percent have college or
more). The state outsources social service delivery to CSOs that have the technical and professional skills to
comply with complex bureaucratic regulations. The social service CSOs are professional associations most
accurately described as third-sector organizations.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the social service policy arena is focused on formal, institutionalized processes
involving internal CSO management and direct engagement with state agencies. These professional CSOs
are directly involved with public officials to ensure they are fulfilling the requirements of their current
contract as well as working to secure future contracts.
Figure 2 also demonstrates that these CSO leaders have limited engagement with electoral politics,
participatory institutions, and protest politics. Public policy management councils in Brazil incorporate
citizens, CSO and union representatives, service providers, and government officials into policy-making
processes. Most councils are charged with the responsibility of approving their sector’s annual budget and
monitoring policy implement. The social service council focuses on legalistic and technical issues, which
discourages CSOs interested in debating broader policy issues within participatory councils. Potential
recipients of social services (service users, clients) are very weakly organized, which means that they are not
present in participatory venues. High hurdles to organizing among the poor account for why well-educated
professionals take the lead in acting on behalf of potential social service recipients.

Figure 2: Third sector: social service CSOs. CSO Leader Survey, Belo Horizonte, 2009.
Small circles = individual survey respondent; larger circles = institutional venues or event.
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The activities at the center of Figure 2 are the result of third-sector CSOs’ alliance with government
officials. Government officials outsource service delivery to professional organizations and the CSOs rely
on government funding to support their organization. The roots of this outsourcing extend back to the
development of the social service policy arena that began under President Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s (Cunha
2009). A consequence of this outsourcing over the twentieth century was very limited state development,
which means that it is not possible to “mobilize the state” because the state is an empty shell in this policy
arena (Abers and Keck 2009). Government officials now find it more advantageous to outsource services
for a range of reasons: lower cost, the absence of unions, increased policy flexibility, and the opportunity to
provide contracts to political allies.
Service contracts tend to be short term and are awarded based on a combination of professional
competence and at the discretion of government officials. CSOs seeking state contracts must demonstrate
that they are professionally competent, but CSO leaders must also maintain strong ties with elected officials.
This helps explain why these CSO leaders had the lowest engagement in public demonstrations.
In sum, it is the absence of an administrative state and the great difficulty in organizing potential
beneficiaries that best explains the shape of democratic politics in this policy arena. The state outsources
service delivery to professional NGOs, which then lack incentives to politically mobilize beneficiaries. Civil
society is thus dominated by third-sector professional organizations that deliver these services. Social
movements comprised of potential beneficiaries of these policies are weakly established, and there are very
few union members in this area. Mayoral administrations have long awarded service delivery contracts to
their preferred professional organizations, but increased political scrutiny is now imposing additional rules
that require greater professionalization. One consequence is that the social service policy council is now a
technically oriented policy council. Thus, this policy arena is dominated by professional third-sector NGOs
that are primarily responsible for service delivery. The establishment of new participatory institutions has
not induced many of the CSOs in this field to be actively involved in participatory governance or in electoral
politics.

Health care: Council democracy

Social movements in the health care policy arena led the struggle to establish public policy management
councils (conselhos) and expand social rights, most notably the right to health care, during the 1980s and
1990s (Jacobi 1989; Sugiyama 2012). Prior to the 1988 Constitution, the Brazilian state provided minimal
resources to meet the health care needs of the poor majority, but it did provide health care services for
unionized workers. The 1988 Constitution produced two significant changes in the field. First, universal
access to health care was a newly gained social right in the 1988 Constitution. Second, the government
decentralized the provision of health care; municipalities are in charge of providing these services. Civil
society mobilization revolved around a municipal-level state charged with building a health care system
(Sistema Único de Saúde or SUS) as well as around council-based democracy.
The sociograph in Figure 3 shows that health care CSO leaders use a variety of activities. The municipal
government is responsible for providing health care via SUS, so it is no surprise that these CSO leaders seek
out policy and political venues through which they can interact with government officials.
Interestingly, there are two distinct clusters of political activities. The cluster on the left represents
extensive “participatory engagement” as these leaders are involved in demonstrations, councils, and direct
contact with public health officials.
Demonstrations are at the center of the activity in this policy arena because they are organized by
CSO leaders’ labor union allies. Demonstrations are a common part of the “repertories of action” that
developed within the health care field during 1980s and 1990s. CSO leaders also know that holding public
demonstrations is a politically viable option because the government cannot cut off funding, since most
funds are transferred by the federal government. This is in sharp contrast to the PB, housing, and social
service fields, where discretionary funding makes up the majority of municipal spending.
The cluster on the right side of the sociograph captures activities associated with representative democracy
as these leaders are intimately involved with campaigns and mobilizing their CSO base—they hold local
meetings, work with political parties, and strive to get out the vote.
To account for the different strategies, we turn first to state formation. During the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil
extended health services through public and private insurance to workers in the formal economy. Although
these employees represented a minority of the population, there was the development of unions of doctors,
nurses, and other medical professionals. Following re-democratization, the Brazilian federal government
established the Universal Health Program (SUS) and greatly expanded spending in this area. The state thus
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Figure 3: Council democracy: health care. CSO Leader Survey, Belo Horizonte, 2009.
Smaller circles = individual survey respondent; larger square = institutional venue or event.
has an active role in the provision of health care, which explains why it is a target of political organizing by
CSOs.
Second, the health civil society field was among the most active in Belo Horizonte. Demonstrations and
protest politics were part of union activities as well as among the CSOs working to improve health care
service. Third, the mayoral administrations encourage community organizations to be directly involved.
Mayor Celio de Castro (1997–2002) was a medical doctor committed to promoting universal health care.
Finally, the participatory institution rules encouraged community-based leaders and union officials to
have a more prominent place in decision-making. The development of two distinct clusters of political
activities results from two separate trends. First, some CSO leaders are choosing the political contestation
and deliberation path, which leads them to work within the councils and to attend public demonstrations.
The second path is the more traditional path of community leaders, which is to work on electoral campaigns.

Housing: Full engagement across multiple arenas

The housing movement is the most active social movement in Belo Horizonte and activists participate
across a broad range of local state institutions. The housing movement in Belo Horizonte was mobilized
in the early 1980s, prior to the formal reestablishment of representative democracy; their activities are in
alignment with James Holston’s (2008) account of insurgent housing movements in São Paulo. Figure 4
demonstrates that CSO leaders in this policy arena are engaged in the greatest number of activities.
It is revealing that only a small minority of the CSOs held active government contracts, which means
that these CSOs do not rely on the state to support their organizations. It is important to note that the two
public policy arenas (housing and health care) in which CSO leaders are the least likely to have social service
contracts are policy arenas in which CSO leaders are the most likely to use demonstrations. We can infer from
these data that the presence of active government contracts reduces the scope of political activities available
to activists.
We begin with civil society to explain why the housing field has the densest, most active, and most
contentious forms of action. First, during the 1980s and early 1990s, housing-based social movements were
extremely active, engaging in multiple land occupations across the city. These contentious land occupations
(generally referred to as illegal invasions by property owners) forged a strong identity and bonds of solidarity
among activists working in the housing field (Alexander 2006; Holston 2008). Thus, social movement activity
prior to the establishment of the 1988 Constitution continues to impact CSO leaders’ ability to sustain their
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Figure 4: Full engagement: housing. CSO Leader Survey, Belo Horizonte, 2009.
Smaller circles = individual survey respondent; larger square = institutional venue or event.
mobilization in the current century. This confirms a long line of work on participatory institutions that
identifies the existing configuration of civil society as a vital component of how new democratic institutions
function (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005; Wampler 2007; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011).
Second, movement leaders work within multiple municipal agencies, two different participatory venues,
the municipal legislature, and federal development banks to build support as they pursue their policy
agenda. The policy and political complexity and large numbers of actors mean that CSO leaders have to
position themselves within multiple venues. The density of their political activities is a response to the
organization of the state. There are more public agencies involved in housing than in the other three areas,
which leads CSOs to actively engage public officials at multiple points.
Third, mayoral administrations generally supported the housing movements, but they lacked the funding
to build the necessary infrastructure. Housing movements and several mayoral administrations forged an
alliance that led activists to mobilize political support through public demonstrations and testimony to the
municipal legislature. Housing movement officials used their political activities to maintain pressure on
mayoral administrations to better ensure continued support. Finally, the policy council rules encouraged
the development of a partnership between the government and CSO leaders. During the periods of study
(2003–2004, 2009–2010), there were political alliances between elected governments and CSO leaders
elected to the council, which turned the council into a politicized body in which they promoted their mutual
interests.
In sum, the housing public policy arena CSO leaders are active participants in multiple spaces as they
respond to a fragmented state policy-making process. They must be everywhere because there are multiple
agencies and elected branches of government that hold some type of relevant responsibility. Housing CSO
leaders are most active in exercising political rights formally established in the 1988 Constitution as a way
to access social and civil rights guaranteed by that constitution. The expansion of the number of places
where housing activists could place their claims and the absence of specific budgetary resources dedicated
to housing induces CSO leaders to be active across the state. Of course, this places a major burden on the
housing movements because they juggle multiple new roles: as social movements, policy-makers, and public
interest groups. Not all groups have the skills and knowledge to carry out this complex set of tasks.

Conclusion

CSO leaders in new democratic settings now employ a great diversity of political strategies in pursuit
of their organizations’ interests. Instead of a dichotomous relationship with state officials (protest or
co-optation), CSO leaders utilize a wide range of strategies. The political network approach utilized in this
article helps to illuminate the clustering of political activities by CSOs within specific policy arenas as well
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as the differences across policy arenas. Although this article focused on four policy arenas in one Brazilian
city, the analytical framework is useful to understand democratic politics across Brazil and Latin America
because it demonstrates how the long-term development of the state and civil society independently
and interactively affects the strategies employed by CSOs in new democratic environments. Based on
this analytical framework, we would expect that the long-term development of the state and civil society,
as well as the specific institutional rules associated with democratization and participatory institutions,
induce CSO leaders to behave in specific ways.
This article demonstrates that when a capable state and bureaucracy were created prior to democratization,
CSOs in the democratic era were more likely to work within civil society as well as with public officials who
control scarce resources. The interests of public officials and CSO leaders are complementary, inducing them
to work together. Public officials seek out the mobilization strength of CSOs while CSO leaders seek out
public goods and policy changes.
The presence of a strong state but limited CSO activity (for example, in the military and corrections sectors)
leads to policy arenas that are the most immune to democratic pressures and the most resistant to policy
and political reform. This combination of strong state and weak civic engagement helps to account for some
of the most abusive and corrupt practices that persist across the region (e.g., military police violence and
pattern of extrajudicial executions; horrific prison conditions; limited civilian control over internal military
affairs).
Conversely, when there was a weak development of the state but an active, mobilized civil society, leaders
were the most likely to pursue their interests in a wide range of formal and informal spaces. CSOs engage in
contentious politics, lobbying, participatory policy-making, election campaigning, and so on. Civil society
organizations are unable to mobilize a state that has limited capacity (Abers and Keck 2009). Rather, CSOs
must engage in the politically contested work of building the necessary political support to invest in building
state capacity.
When there is a weak state, and civil society is demobilized, professional NGOs, many of which hold service
delivery contracts, gain prominence in the policy arenas because they act as both “state” and “civil society”
to deliver services. Thus, when long-term state development is absent, and when civil society capacity is low,
there is a greater likelihood that well-organized, professionalized groups will dominate the policy sector.
We would expect professional lobbies or third-sector NGOs to have a much more active role in civil society
formation.
These lessons are applicable beyond Belo Horizonte in two ways. Analytically, the key insight is
that we must better incorporate state formation and state capacity in basic analyses of democratic
politics. The study of participatory institutions, for example, often downplays the role of the state, but
this analysis has demonstrated the vital importance of the presence of the state in producing actors
(unions) as well as being the target of CSOs’ strategies. The second important insight is that researchers
need to be much more mindful of the variation across policy arenas, especially in decentralized and
democratic settings. The analysis in this article demonstrates how basic differences in state formation
and the configuration of civil society induce CSO activists to engage in very different behaviors. This
analytical framework can be applied from the US-Mexico border region to environmental conflicts in
the Amazon and Andes to better understand the strategies employed by CSOs as they pursue their
organizations’ interests.
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